This file was created by the TYPO3 extension bib --- Timezone: CEST Creation date: 2024-04-26 Creation time: 23-32-31 --- Number of references 13 inproceedings 2020_pennekamp_benchmarking 2020 12 15 31-44 Benchmarking the performance of companies is essential to identify improvement potentials in various industries. Due to a competitive environment, this process imposes strong privacy needs, as leaked business secrets can have devastating effects on participating companies. Consequently, related work proposes to protect sensitive input data of companies using secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption. However, related work so far does not consider that also the benchmarking algorithm, used in today's applied real-world scenarios to compute all relevant statistics, itself contains significant intellectual property, and thus needs to be protected. Addressing this issue, we present PCB — a practical design for Privacy-preserving Company Benchmarking that utilizes homomorphic encryption and a privacy proxy — which is specifically tailored for realistic real-world applications in which we protect companies' sensitive input data and the valuable algorithms used to compute underlying key performance indicators. We evaluate PCB's performance using synthetic measurements and showcase its applicability alongside an actual company benchmarking performed in the domain of injection molding, covering 48 distinct key performance indicators calculated out of hundreds of different input values. By protecting the privacy of all participants, we enable them to fully profit from the benefits of company benchmarking. practical encrypted computing; homomorphic encryption; algorithm confidentiality; benchmarking; key performance indicators; industrial application; Internet of Production internet-of-production https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-company-benchmarking.pdf https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1512 HomomorphicEncryption.org Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Encrypted Computing & Applied Homomorphic Cryptography (WAHC '20), December 15, 2020, Virtual Event Virtual Event December 15, 2020 978-3-00-067798-4 10.25835/0072999 1 JanPennekamp PatrickSapel Ina BereniceFink SimonWagner SebastianReuter ChristianHopmann KlausWehrle MartinHenze inproceedings 2020_pennekamp_parameter_exchange 2020 12 10 510-525 Nowadays, collaborations between industrial companies always go hand in hand with trust issues, i.e., exchanging valuable production data entails the risk of improper use of potentially sensitive information. Therefore, companies hesitate to offer their production data, e.g., process parameters that would allow other companies to establish new production lines faster, against a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the expected benefits of industrial collaboration, data exchanges, and the utilization of external knowledge are significant. In this paper, we introduce our Bloom filter-based Parameter Exchange (BPE), which enables companies to exchange process parameters privacy-preservingly. We demonstrate the applicability of our platform based on two distinct real-world use cases: injection molding and machine tools. We show that BPE is both scalable and deployable for different needs to foster industrial collaborations. Thereby, we reward data-providing companies with payments while preserving their valuable data and reducing the risks of data leakage. secure industrial collaboration; Bloom filter; oblivious transfer; Internet of Production internet-of-production https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-parameter-exchange.pdf ACM Proceedings of the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA Austin, TX, USA December 7-11, 2020 978-1-4503-8858-0/20/12 10.1145/3427228.3427248 1 JanPennekamp ErikBuchholz YannikLockner MarkusDahlmanns TiandongXi MarcelFey ChristianBrecher ChristianHopmann KlausWehrle inproceedings 2020_delacadena_trafficsliver 2020 11 12 1971-1985 Website fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node — one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor — a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only. To limit the exposure of Tor users to WFP, we propose novel lightweight WFP defenses, TrafficSliver, which successfully counter today’s WFP classifiers with reasonable bandwidth and latency overheads and, thus, make them attractive candidates for adoption in Tor. Through user-controlled splitting of traffic over multiple Tor entry nodes, TrafficSliver limits the data a single entry node can observe and distorts repeatable traffic patterns exploited by WFP attacks. We first propose a network-layer defense, in which we apply the concept of multipathing entirely within the Tor network. We show that our network-layer defense reduces the accuracy from more than 98% to less than 16% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. We further suggest an elegant client-side application-layer defense, which is independent of the underlying anonymization network. By sending single HTTP requests for different web objects over distinct Tor entry nodes, our application-layer defense reduces the detection rate of WFP classifiers by almost 50 percentage points. Although it offers lower protection than our network-layer defense, it provides a security boost at the cost of a very low implementation overhead and is fully compatible with today’s Tor network. Traffic Analysis; Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-delacadena-trafficsliver.pdf https://github.com/TrafficSliver ACM Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '20), November 9-13, 2020, Orlando, FL, USA Virtual Event, USA November 9-13, 2020 978-1-4503-7089-9/20/11 10.1145/3372297.3423351 1 WladimirDe la Cadena AsyaMitseva JensHiller JanPennekamp SebastianReuter JulianFilter KlausWehrle ThomasEngel AndriyPanchenko inproceedings 2020-hiller-ccs-crosssigning 2020 11 11 1289-1306 PKI; X.509; SSL; TLS; cross-signing; cross certification https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-hiller-ccs-cross_signing.pdf https://github.com/pki-xs-analysis ACM

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Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA. Orlando, FL, USA November 9-13, 2020 10.1145/3372297.3423345 1 JensHiller JohannaAmann OliverHohlfeld inproceedings 2020-wolsing-facilitating 2020 11 9 Cyber-physical systems are increasingly threatened by sophisticated attackers, also attacking the physical aspect of systems. Supplementing protective measures, industrial intrusion detection systems promise to detect such attacks. However, due to industrial protocol diversity and lack of standard interfaces, great efforts are required to adapt these technologies to a large number of different protocols. To address this issue, we identify existing universally applicable intrusion detection approaches and propose a transcription for industrial protocols to realize protocol-independent semantic intrusion detection on top of different industrial protocols. Intrusion Detection; IDS; Industrial Protocols; CPS; IEC-60870-5-104; Modbus; NMEA 0183 https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-wolsing-facilitating.pdf ACM

New York, NY, USA

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA. Virtual Event, USA November 9-13, 2020 10.1145/3372297.3420019 1 KonradWolsing EricWagner MartinHenze inproceedings 2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity 2020 11 9 Mitigating cybersecurity threats in power distribution grids requires a testbed for cybersecurity, e.g., to evaluate the (physical) impact of cyberattacks, generate datasets, test and validate security approaches, as well as train technical personnel. In this paper, we present a blueprint for such a testbed that relies on network emulation and power flow computation to couple real network applications with a simulated power grid. We discuss the benefits of our approach alongside preliminary results and various use cases for cybersecurity research and training for power distribution grids. https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity.pdf ACM

New York, NY, USA

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA. Virtual Event, USA November 9-13, 2020 10.1145/3372297.3420016 1 MartinHenze LennartBader JulianFilter OlavLamberts SimonOfner Dennisvan der Velde inproceedings 2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua 2020 10 27 101-110 Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25%) on in total 92% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols. industrial communication; network security; security configuration internet-of-production, rfc https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua.pdf ACM Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), October 27-29, 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Pittsburgh, PA, USA ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2020 October 27-29, 2020 978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10 10.1145/3419394.3423666 1 MarkusDahlmanns JohannesLohmöller Ina BereniceFink JanPennekamp KlausWehrle MartinHenze article serror-iiotsec-tii-2020 IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 2020 9 11 17 5 2985-2996 nerd-nrw https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-serror-tii-iiotsec.pdf https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9195014 online 1941-0050 10.1109/TII.2020.3023507 1 MartinSerror SachaHack MartinHenze MarkoSchuba KlausWehrle article 2020-holz-ccr-tls13 ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communications Review (CCR) 2020 7 50 3 3-15 Selected for the 'Best of CCR' session at SIGCOMM 2021. https://ccronline.sigcomm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/sigcomm-ccr-paper430-with-open-review.pdf Association for Computing Machinery

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10.1145/3411740.3411742 1 RalphHolz JensHiller JohannaAmann AbbasRazaghpanah ThomasJost NarseoVallina-Rodriguez OliverHohlfeld inproceedings 2020_matzutt_coinprune 2020 6 24 298-306 Bitcoin was the first successful decentralized cryptocurrency and remains the most popular of its kind to this day. Despite the benefits of its blockchain, Bitcoin still faces serious scalability issues, most importantly its ever-increasing blockchain size. While alternative designs introduced schemes to periodically create snapshots and thereafter prune older blocks, already-deployed systems such as Bitcoin are often considered incapable of adopting corresponding approaches. In this work, we revise this popular belief and present CoinPrune, a snapshot-based pruning scheme that is fully compatible with Bitcoin. CoinPrune can be deployed through an opt-in velvet fork, i.e., without impeding the established Bitcoin network. By requiring miners to publicly announce and jointly reaffirm recent snapshots on the blockchain, CoinPrune establishes trust into the snapshots' correctness even in the presence of powerful adversaries. Our evaluation shows that CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements of Bitcoin already by two orders of magnitude today, with further relative savings as the blockchain grows. In our experiments, nodes only have to fetch and process 5 GiB instead of 230 GiB of data when joining the network, reducing the synchronization time on powerful devices from currently 5 h to 46 min, with even more savings for less powerful devices. blockchain; block pruning; synchronization; bootstrapping; scalability; velvet fork; Bitcoin mynedata; impact_digital; digital_campus https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-matzutt-coinprune.pdf https://coinprune.comsys.rwth-aachen.de IEEE Proceedings of the 19th IFIP Networking 2020 Conference (NETWORKING '20), June 22-26, 2020, Paris, France Paris, France NETWORKING 2020 June 22-26, 2020 978-3-903176-28-7 1 RomanMatzutt BenediktKalde JanPennekamp ArthurDrichel MartinHenze KlausWehrle inproceedings 2020_pennekamp_supply_chain_accountability 2020 6 7 Today's supply chains are becoming increasingly flexible in nature. While adaptability is vastly increased, these more dynamic associations necessitate more extensive data sharing among different stakeholders while simultaneously overturning previously established levels of trust. Hence, manufacturers' demand to track goods and to investigate root causes of issues across their supply chains becomes more challenging to satisfy within these now untrusted environments. Complementarily, suppliers need to keep any data irrelevant to such routine checks secret to remain competitive. To bridge the needs of contractors and suppliers in increasingly flexible supply chains, we thus propose to establish a privacy-preserving and distributed multi-hop accountability log among the involved stakeholders based on Attribute-based Encryption and backed by a blockchain. Our large-scale feasibility study is motivated by a real-world manufacturing process, i.e., a fine blanking line, and reveals only modest costs for multi-hop tracing and tracking of goods. supply chain; multi-hop tracking and tracing; blockchain; attribute-based encryption; Internet of Production internet-of-production https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-supply-chain-privacy.pdf IEEE Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC Workshops '20), 1st Workshop on Blockchain for IoT and Cyber-Physical Systems (BIoTCPS '20), June 7-11, 2020, Dublin, Ireland Dublin, Ireland June 7-11, 2020 978-1-7281-7440-2 2474-9133 10.1109/ICCWorkshops49005.2020.9145100 1 JanPennekamp LennartBader RomanMatzutt PhilippNiemietz DanielTrauth MartinHenze ThomasBergs KlausWehrle inproceedings 2020_roepert_opcua 2020 4 2 To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors. internet-of-production, rfc https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-roepert-opcua-security.pdf en University of Tübingen Proceedings of the 1st ITG Workshop on IT Security (ITSec '20), April 2-3, 2020, Tübingen, Germany Tübingen, Germany April 2-3, 2020 10.15496/publikation-41813 1 LinusRoepert MarkusDahlmanns Ina BereniceFink JanPennekamp MartinHenze inproceedings 2020-kosek-tcp-conformance 2020 3 30 maki https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-kosek-tcp-conformance-v2.pdf https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05400 Springer Proceedings of the Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM '20) Eugene, Oregon, USA Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM 2020) 30.03.2020 - 31.03.2020 en https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_8 1 MikeKosek LeoBlöcher JanRüth TorstenZimmermann OliverHohlfeld