% 
% This file was created by the TYPO3 extension
% bib
% --- Timezone: CEST
% Creation date: 2024-04-27
% Creation time: 04-06-03
% --- Number of references
% 11
% 

@Inproceedings { 2022_pennekamp_cumul,
   title = {CUMUL \& Co: High-Impact Artifacts for Website Fingerprinting Research},
   year = {2022},
   month = {12},
   day = {8},
   number = {RWTH-2022-10811},
   abstract = {Anonymous communication on the Internet is about hiding the relationship between communicating parties. At NDSS '16, we presented a new website fingerprinting approach, CUMUL, that utilizes novel features and a simple yet powerful algorithm to attack anonymization networks such as Tor. Based on pattern observation of data flows, this attack aims at identifying the content of encrypted and anonymized connections. Apart from the feature generation and the used classifier, we also provided a large dataset to the research community to study the attack at Internet scale. In this paper, we emphasize the impact of our artifacts by analyzing publications referring to our work with respect to the dataset, feature extraction method, and source code of the implementation. Based on this data, we draw conclusions about the impact of our artifacts on the research field and discuss their influence on related cybersecurity topics. Overall, from 393 unique citations, we discover more than 130 academic references that utilize our artifacts, 61 among them are highly influential (according to SemanticScholar), and at least 35 are from top-ranked security venues. This data underlines the significant relevance and impact of our work as well as of our artifacts in the community and beyond.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2022/2022-pennekamp-cumul-artifacts.pdf},
   web_url = {https://www.acsac.org/2022/program/artifacts_competition/},
   publisher = {ACSA},
   booktitle = {Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award at 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '22), December 5-9, 2022, Austin, TX, USA},
   event_place = {Austin, TX, USA},
   event_name = {38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '22)},
   event_date = {December 5-9, 2022},
   DOI = {10.18154/RWTH-2022-10811},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Henze, Martin and Zinnen, Andreas and Lanze, Fabian and Wehrle, Klaus and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2021_mitseva_sequences,
   title = {POSTER: How Dangerous is My Click? Boosting Website Fingerprinting By Considering Sequences of Webpages},
   year = {2021},
   month = {11},
   day = {17},
   pages = {2411-2413},
   abstract = {Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special case of traffic analysis, where a passive attacker infers information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows. Although modern WFP attacks pose a serious threat to online privacy of users, including Tor users, they usually aim to detect single pages only. By ignoring the browsing behavior of users, the attacker excludes valuable information: users visit multiple pages of a single website consecutively, e.g., by following links. In this paper, we propose two novel methods that can take advantage of the consecutive visits of multiple pages to detect websites. We show that two up to three clicks within a site allow attackers to boost the accuracy by more than 20\% and to dramatically increase the threat to users' privacy. We argue that WFP defenses have to consider this new dimension of the attack surface.},
   keywords = {Traffic Analysis; Website Fingerprinting; Web Privacy},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-mitseva-fingerprinting-sequences.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '21), November 15-19, 2021, Seoul, Korea},
   event_place = {Seoul, Korea},
   event_date = {November 15-19, 2021},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-8454-4/21/11},
   DOI = {10.1145/3460120.3485347},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Mitseva, Asya and Pennekamp, Jan and Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Ziemann, Torsten and Hoerchner, Carl and Wehrle, Klaus and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2021_reuter_demo,
   title = {Demo: Traffic Splitting for Tor — A Defense against Fingerprinting Attacks},
   year = {2021},
   month = {9},
   day = {14},
   abstract = {Website fingerprinting (WFP) attacks on the anonymity network Tor have become ever more effective. Furthermore, research discovered that proposed defenses are insufficient or cause high overhead. In previous work, we presented a new WFP defense for Tor that incorporates multipath transmissions to repel malicious Tor nodes from conducting WFP attacks. In this demo, we showcase the operation of our traffic splitting defense by visually illustrating the underlying Tor multipath transmission using LED-equipped Raspberry Pis.},
   note = {Electronic Communications of the EASST, Volume 080},
   keywords = {Onion Routing; Website Fingerprinting; Multipath Traffic; Privacy},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-reuter-splitting-demo.pdf},
   publisher = {TU Berlin},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2021 International Conference on Networked Systems (NetSys '21), September 13-16, 2021, L{\"u}beck, Germany},
   event_place = {L{\"u}beck, Germany},
   event_date = {September 13-16, 2021},
   ISSN = {1863-2122},
   DOI = {10.14279/tuj.eceasst.80.1151},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Reuter, Sebastian and Hiller, Jens and Pennekamp, Jan and Panchenko, Andriy and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020_delacadena_trafficsliver,
   title = {TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting},
   year = {2020},
   month = {11},
   day = {12},
   pages = {1971-1985},
   abstract = {Website fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node — one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor — a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only.
To limit the exposure of Tor users to WFP, we propose novel lightweight WFP defenses, TrafficSliver, which successfully counter today’s WFP classifiers with reasonable bandwidth and latency overheads and, thus, make them attractive candidates for adoption in Tor. Through user-controlled splitting of traffic over multiple Tor entry nodes, TrafficSliver limits the data a single entry node can observe and distorts repeatable traffic patterns exploited by WFP attacks. We first propose a network-layer defense, in which we apply the concept of multipathing entirely within the Tor network. We show that our network-layer defense reduces the accuracy from more than 98\% to less than 16\% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. We further suggest an elegant client-side application-layer defense, which is independent of the underlying anonymization network. By sending single HTTP requests for different web objects over distinct Tor entry nodes, our application-layer defense reduces the detection rate of WFP classifiers by almost 50 percentage points. Although it offers lower protection than our network-layer defense, it provides a security boost at the cost of a very low implementation overhead and is fully compatible with today’s Tor network.},
   keywords = {Traffic Analysis; Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-delacadena-trafficsliver.pdf},
   web_url = {https://github.com/TrafficSliver},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '20), November 9-13, 2020, Orlando, FL, USA},
   event_place = {Virtual Event, USA},
   event_date = {November 9-13, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-7089-9/20/11},
   DOI = {10.1145/3372297.3423351},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {De la Cadena, Wladimir and Mitseva, Asya and Hiller, Jens and Pennekamp, Jan and Reuter, Sebastian and Filter, Julian and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019_delacadena_countermeasure,
   title = {POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting},
   year = {2019},
   month = {11},
   day = {12},
   pages = {2533-2535},
   abstract = {Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95\% to less than 35\% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-delacadena-splitting-defense.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '19), November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom},
   event_place = {London, United Kingdom},
   event_date = {November 11-15, 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11},
   DOI = {10.1145/3319535.3363249},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {De la Cadena, Wladimir and Mitseva, Asya and Pennekamp, Jan and Hiller, Jens and Lanze, Fabian and Engel, Thomas and Wehrle, Klaus and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019-hiller-icnp-tailoringOR,
   title = {Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments},
   year = {2019},
   month = {10},
   day = {10},
   abstract = {An increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-to-end security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices.},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-hiller-tailoring.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP '19), October 7-10, 2019, Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_place = {Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_name = {27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2019)},
   event_date = {7-10. Oct. 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-7281-2700-2},
   ISSN = {2643-3303},
   DOI = {10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888033},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Hiller, Jens and Pennekamp, Jan and Dahlmanns, Markus and Henze, Martin and Panchenko, Andriy and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019_pennekamp_multipath,
   title = {Multipathing Traffic to Reduce Entry Node Exposure in Onion Routing},
   year = {2019},
   month = {10},
   day = {7},
   abstract = {Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation.},
   note = {Poster Session},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-pennekamp-multipathing.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP '19), October 7-10, 2019, Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_place = {Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_name = {27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2019)},
   event_date = {7-10. Oct. 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-7281-2700-2},
   ISSN = {2643-3303},
   DOI = {10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888029},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Hiller, Jens and Reuter, Sebastian and De la Cadena, Wladimir and Mitseva, Asya and Henze, Martin and Engel, Thomas and Wehrle, Klaus and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019_pennekamp_doppelganger,
   title = {Hi Doppelg{\"a}nger: Towards Detecting Manipulation in News Comments},
   year = {2019},
   month = {5},
   day = {13},
   pages = {197-205},
   abstract = {Public opinion manipulation is a serious threat to society, potentially influencing elections and the political situation even in established democracies. The prevalence of online media and the opportunity for users to express opinions in comments magnifies the problem. Governments, organizations, and companies can exploit this situation for biasing opinions. Typically, they deploy a large number of pseudonyms to create an impression of a crowd that supports specific opinions. Side channel information (such as IP addresses or identities of browsers) often allows a reliable detection of pseudonyms managed by a single person. However, while spoofing and anonymizing data that links these accounts is simple, a linking without is very challenging. In this paper, we evaluate whether stylometric features allow a detection of such doppelg{\"a}ngers within comment sections on news articles. To this end, we adapt a state-of-the-art doppelg{\"a}ngers detector to work on small texts (such as comments) and apply it on three popular news sites in two languages. Our results reveal that detecting potential doppelg{\"a}ngers based on linguistics is a promising approach even when no reliable side channel information is available. Preliminary results following an application in the wild shows indications for doppelg{\"a}ngers in real world data sets.},
   keywords = {online manipulation; doppelg{\"a}nger detection; stylometry},
   tags = {comtex},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-pennekamp-doppelganger.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW '19 Companion), 4th Workshop on Computational Methods in Online Misbehavior (CyberSafety '19), May 13–17, 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA},
   event_place = {San Francisco, California, USA},
   event_date = {May 13-17, 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-6675-5/19/05},
   DOI = {10.1145/3308560.3316496},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Henze, Martin and Hohlfeld, Oliver and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2017-panchenko-wpes-fingerprinting,
   title = {Analysis of Fingerprinting Techniques for Tor Hidden Services},
   year = {2017},
   month = {10},
   day = {30},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2017/2017-panchenko-wpes-fingerprinting.pdf},
   misc2 = {Online},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 16th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES), co-located with the 24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Dallas, TX, USA},
   language = {en},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-5175-1},
   DOI = {10.1145/3139550.3139564},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Panchenko, Andriy and Mitseva, Asya and Henze, Martin and Lanze, Fabian and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas}
}

@Inproceedings { 2016-mitseva-ccs-fingerprinting,
   title = {POSTER: Fingerprinting Tor Hidden Services},
   year = {2016},
   month = {10},
   day = {24},
   pages = {1766-1768},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2016/2016-mitseva-ccs-fingerprinting.pdf},
   misc2 = {Online},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Vienna, Austria},
   language = {en},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-4139-4},
   DOI = {10.1145/2976749.2989054},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Mitseva, Asya and Panchenko, Andriy and Lanze, Fabian and Henze, Martin and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas}
}

@Inproceedings { 2016-panchenko-ndss-fingerprinting,
   title = {Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale},
   year = {2016},
   month = {2},
   day = {21},
   abstract = {The website fingerprinting attack aims to identify the content (i.e., a webpage accessed by a client) of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows such as packet size and direction. This attack can be performed by a local passive eavesdropper – one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of anonymization networks such as Tor. In this paper, we present a novel website fingerprinting attack. Based on a simple and comprehensible idea, our approach outperforms all state-of-the-art methods in terms of classification accuracy while being computationally dramatically more efficient. In order to evaluate the severity of the website fingerprinting attack in reality, we collected the most representative dataset that has ever been built, where we avoid simplified assumptions made in the related work regarding selection and type of webpages and the size of the universe. Using this data, we explore the practical limits of website fingerprinting at Internet scale. Although our novel approach is by orders of magnitude computationally more efficient and superior in terms of detection accuracy, for the first time we show that no existing method – including our own – scales when applied in realistic settings. With our analysis, we explore neglected aspects of the attack and investigate the realistic probability of success for different strategies a real-world adversary may follow.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2016/2016-panchenko-ndss-fingerprinting.pdf},
   web_url = {https://www.informatik.tu-cottbus.de/\verb=~=andriy/zwiebelfreunde/},
   publisher = {Internet Society},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '16), February 21-24, 2016, San Diego, CA, USA},
   event_place = {San Diego, CA, USA},
   event_date = {February 21-24, 2016},
   ISBN = {978-1-891562-41-9},
   DOI = {10.14722/ndss.2016.23477},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Panchenko, Andriy and Lanze, Fabian and Zinnen, Andreas and Henze, Martin and Pennekamp, Jan and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas}
}