This file was created by the TYPO3 extension
bib
--- Timezone: CEST
Creation date: 2024-04-25
Creation time: 14-03-05
--- Number of references
4
inproceedings
2021_pennekamp_laser
Collaboration is not Evil: A Systematic Look at Security Research for Industrial Use
2021
12
21
Following the recent Internet of Things-induced trends on digitization in general, industrial applications will further evolve as well. With a focus on the domains of manufacturing and production, the Internet of Production pursues the vision of a digitized, globally interconnected, yet secure environment by establishing a distributed knowledge base.
Background. As part of our collaborative research of advancing the scope of industrial applications through cybersecurity and privacy, we identified a set of common challenges and pitfalls that surface in such applied interdisciplinary collaborations.
Aim. Our goal with this paper is to support researchers in the emerging field of cybersecurity in industrial settings by formalizing our experiences as reference for other research efforts, in industry and academia alike.
Method. Based on our experience, we derived a process cycle of performing such interdisciplinary research, from the initial idea to the eventual dissemination and paper writing. This presented methodology strives to successfully bootstrap further research and to encourage further work in this emerging area.
Results. Apart from our newly proposed process cycle, we report on our experiences and conduct a case study applying this methodology, raising awareness for challenges in cybersecurity research for industrial applications. We further detail the interplay between our process cycle and the data lifecycle in applied research data management. Finally, we augment our discussion with an industrial as well as an academic view on this research area and highlight that both areas still have to overcome significant challenges to sustainably and securely advance industrial applications.
Conclusions. With our proposed process cycle for interdisciplinary research in the intersection of cybersecurity and industrial application, we provide a foundation for further research. We look forward to promising research initiatives, projects, and directions that emerge based on our methodological work.
internet-of-production
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-pennekamp-laser-collaboration.pdf
ACSA
Proceedings of the Workshop on Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER '20), co-located with the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA
Austin, TX, USA
Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER '20)
December 8, 2020
978-1-891562-81-5
10.14722/laser-acsac.2020.23088
1
JanPennekamp
ErikBuchholz
MarkusDahlmanns
IkeKunze
StefanBraun
EricWagner
MatthiasBrockmann
KlausWehrle
MartinHenze
article
2021_matzutt_coinprune_v2
CoinPrune: Shrinking Bitcoin's Blockchain Retrospectively
IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
2021
9
10
18
3
3064-3078
Popular cryptocurrencies continue to face serious scalability issues due to their ever-growing blockchains. Thus, modern blockchain designs began to prune old blocks and rely on recent snapshots for their bootstrapping processes instead. Unfortunately, established systems are often considered incapable of adopting these improvements. In this work, we present CoinPrune, our block-pruning scheme with full Bitcoin compatibility, to revise this popular belief. CoinPrune bootstraps joining nodes via snapshots that are periodically created from Bitcoin's set of unspent transaction outputs (UTXO set). Our scheme establishes trust in these snapshots by relying on CoinPrune-supporting miners to mutually reaffirm a snapshot's correctness on the blockchain. This way, snapshots remain trustworthy even if adversaries attempt to tamper with them. Our scheme maintains its retrospective deployability by relying on positive feedback only, i.e., blocks containing invalid reaffirmations are not rejected, but invalid reaffirmations are outpaced by the benign ones created by an honest majority among CoinPrune-supporting miners. Already today, CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements for Bitcoin nodes by two orders of magnitude, as joining nodes need to fetch and process only 6 GiB instead of 271 GiB of data in our evaluation, reducing the synchronization time of powerful devices from currently 7 h to 51 min, with even larger potential drops for less powerful devices. CoinPrune is further aware of higher-level application data, i.e., it conserves otherwise pruned application data and allows nodes to obfuscate objectionable and potentially illegal blockchain content from their UTXO set and the snapshots they distribute.
blockchain; block pruning; synchronization; bootstrapping; scalability; velvet fork; Bitcoin
mynedata; impact_digital; digital_campus
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-matzutt-coinprune-v2.pdf
English
1932-4537
10.1109/TNSM.2021.3073270
1
RomanMatzutt
BenediktKalde
JanPennekamp
ArthurDrichel
MartinHenze
KlausWehrle
article
2021_pennekamp_ercim
Unlocking Secure Industrial Collaborations through Privacy-Preserving Computation
ERCIM News
2021
7
9
126
24-25
In industrial settings, significant process improvements can be achieved when utilising and sharing information across stakeholders. However, traditionally conservative companies impose significant confidentiality requirements for any (external) data processing. We discuss how privacy-preserving computation can unlock secure and private collaborations even in such competitive environments.
internet-of-production
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-pennekamp-ercim-news.pdf
https://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en126/special/unlocking-secure-industrial-collaborations-through-privacy-preserving-computation
ERCIM EEIG
0926-4981
JanPennekamp
MartinHenze
KlausWehrle
inproceedings
2021_dahlmanns_entrust
Transparent End-to-End Security for Publish/Subscribe Communication in Cyber-Physical Systems
2021
4
28
78–87
The ongoing digitization of industrial manufacturing leads to a decisive change in industrial communication paradigms. Moving from traditional one-to-one to many-to-many communication, publish/subscribe systems promise a more dynamic and efficient exchange of data. However, the resulting significantly more complex communication relationships render traditional end-to-end security futile for sufficiently protecting the sensitive and safety-critical data transmitted in industrial systems. Most notably, the central message brokers inherent in publish/subscribe systems introduce a designated weak spot for security as they can access all communication messages. To address this issue, we propose ENTRUST, a novel solution for key server-based end-to-end security in publish/subscribe systems. ENTRUST transparently realizes confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for publish/subscribe systems without any modification of the underlying protocol. We exemplarily implement ENTRUST on top of MQTT, the de-facto standard for machine-to-machine communication, showing that ENTRUST can integrate seamlessly into existing publish/subscribe systems.
cyber-physical system security; publish-subscribe security; end-to-end security
internet-of-production, rfc
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-dahlmanns-entrust.pdf
ACM
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Systems (SaT-CPS '21), co-located with the 11th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY '21), April 26-28, 2021, Virtual Event, USA
Virtual Event, USA
ACM Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Systems
April 28, 2021
978-1-4503-8319-6/21/04
10.1145/3445969.3450423
1
MarkusDahlmanns
JanPennekamp
Ina BereniceFink
BerndSchoolmann
KlausWehrle
MartinHenze