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bib
--- Timezone: CET
Creation date: 2024-03-29
Creation time: 12-12-01
--- Number of references
8
inproceedings
2020_pennekamp_benchmarking
Revisiting the Privacy Needs of Real-World Applicable Company Benchmarking
2020
12
15
31-44
Benchmarking the performance of companies is essential to identify improvement potentials in various industries. Due to a competitive environment, this process imposes strong privacy needs, as leaked business secrets can have devastating effects on participating companies. Consequently, related work proposes to protect sensitive input data of companies using secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption. However, related work so far does not consider that also the benchmarking algorithm, used in today's applied real-world scenarios to compute all relevant statistics, itself contains significant intellectual property, and thus needs to be protected. Addressing this issue, we present PCB — a practical design for Privacy-preserving Company Benchmarking that utilizes homomorphic encryption and a privacy proxy — which is specifically tailored for realistic real-world applications in which we protect companies' sensitive input data and the valuable algorithms used to compute underlying key performance indicators. We evaluate PCB's performance using synthetic measurements and showcase its applicability alongside an actual company benchmarking performed in the domain of injection molding, covering 48 distinct key performance indicators calculated out of hundreds of different input values. By protecting the privacy of all participants, we enable them to fully profit from the benefits of company benchmarking.
practical encrypted computing; homomorphic encryption; algorithm confidentiality; benchmarking; key performance indicators; industrial application; Internet of Production
internet-of-production
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-company-benchmarking.pdf
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1512
HomomorphicEncryption.org
Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Encrypted Computing & Applied Homomorphic Cryptography (WAHC '20), December 15, 2020, Virtual Event
Virtual Event
December 15, 2020
978-3-00-067798-4
10.25835/0072999
1
JanPennekamp
PatrickSapel
Ina BereniceFink
SimonWagner
SebastianReuter
ChristianHopmann
KlausWehrle
MartinHenze
inproceedings
2020-wolsing-facilitating
Poster: Facilitating Protocol-independent Industrial Intrusion Detection Systems
2020
11
9
Cyber-physical systems are increasingly threatened by sophisticated attackers, also attacking the physical aspect of systems. Supplementing protective measures, industrial intrusion detection systems promise to detect such attacks. However, due to industrial protocol diversity and lack of standard interfaces, great efforts are required to adapt these technologies to a large number of different protocols. To address this issue, we identify existing universally applicable intrusion detection approaches and propose a transcription for industrial protocols to realize protocol-independent semantic intrusion detection on top of different industrial protocols.
Intrusion Detection; IDS; Industrial Protocols; CPS; IEC-60870-5-104; Modbus; NMEA 0183
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-wolsing-facilitating.pdf
ACM
New York, NY, USA
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA.
Virtual Event, USA
November 9-13, 2020
10.1145/3372297.3420019
1
KonradWolsing
EricWagner
MartinHenze
inproceedings
2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity
Poster: Cybersecurity Research and Training for Power Distribution Grids -- A Blueprint
2020
11
9
Mitigating cybersecurity threats in power distribution grids requires a testbed for cybersecurity, e.g., to evaluate the (physical) impact of cyberattacks, generate datasets, test and validate security approaches, as well as train technical personnel. In this paper, we present a blueprint for such a testbed that relies on network emulation and power flow computation to couple real network applications with a simulated power grid. We discuss the benefits of our approach alongside preliminary results and various use cases for cybersecurity research and training for power distribution grids.
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity.pdf
ACM
New York, NY, USA
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA.
Virtual Event, USA
November 9-13, 2020
10.1145/3372297.3420016
1
MartinHenze
LennartBader
JulianFilter
OlavLamberts
SimonOfner
Dennisvan der Velde
inproceedings
2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua
Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments
2020
10
27
101-110
Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25%) on in total 92% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.
industrial communication; network security; security configuration
internet-of-production, rfc
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua.pdf
ACM
Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), October 27-29, 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2020
October 27-29, 2020
978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10
10.1145/3419394.3423666
1
MarkusDahlmanns
JohannesLohmöller
Ina BereniceFink
JanPennekamp
KlausWehrle
MartinHenze
article
serror-iiotsec-tii-2020
Challenges and Opportunities in Securing the Industrial Internet of Things
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
2020
9
11
17
5
2985-2996
nerd-nrw
https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-serror-tii-iiotsec.pdf
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9195014
online
1941-0050
10.1109/TII.2020.3023507
1
MartinSerror
SachaHack
MartinHenze
MarkoSchuba
KlausWehrle
inproceedings
2020_matzutt_coinprune
How to Securely Prune Bitcoin’s Blockchain
2020
6
24
298-306
Bitcoin was the first successful decentralized cryptocurrency and remains the most popular of its kind to this day. Despite the benefits of its blockchain, Bitcoin still faces serious scalability issues, most importantly its ever-increasing blockchain size. While alternative designs introduced schemes to periodically create snapshots and thereafter prune older blocks, already-deployed systems such as Bitcoin are often considered incapable of adopting corresponding approaches. In this work, we revise this popular belief and present CoinPrune, a snapshot-based pruning scheme that is fully compatible with Bitcoin. CoinPrune can be deployed through an opt-in velvet fork, i.e., without impeding the established Bitcoin network. By requiring miners to publicly announce and jointly reaffirm recent snapshots on the blockchain, CoinPrune establishes trust into the snapshots' correctness even in the presence of powerful adversaries. Our evaluation shows that CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements of Bitcoin already by two orders of magnitude today, with further relative savings as the blockchain grows. In our experiments, nodes only have to fetch and process 5 GiB instead of 230 GiB of data when joining the network, reducing the synchronization time on powerful devices from currently 5 h to 46 min, with even more savings for less powerful devices.
blockchain; block pruning; synchronization; bootstrapping; scalability; velvet fork; Bitcoin
mynedata; impact_digital; digital_campus
https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-matzutt-coinprune.pdf
https://coinprune.comsys.rwth-aachen.de
IEEE
Proceedings of the 19th IFIP Networking 2020 Conference (NETWORKING '20), June 22-26, 2020, Paris, France
Paris, France
NETWORKING 2020
June 22-26, 2020
978-3-903176-28-7
1
RomanMatzutt
BenediktKalde
JanPennekamp
ArthurDrichel
MartinHenze
KlausWehrle
inproceedings
2020_pennekamp_supply_chain_accountability
Private Multi-Hop Accountability for Supply Chains
2020
6
7
Today's supply chains are becoming increasingly flexible in nature. While adaptability is vastly increased, these more dynamic associations necessitate more extensive data sharing among different stakeholders while simultaneously overturning previously established levels of trust. Hence, manufacturers' demand to track goods and to investigate root causes of issues across their supply chains becomes more challenging to satisfy within these now untrusted environments. Complementarily, suppliers need to keep any data irrelevant to such routine checks secret to remain competitive. To bridge the needs of contractors and suppliers in increasingly flexible supply chains, we thus propose to establish a privacy-preserving and distributed multi-hop accountability log among the involved stakeholders based on Attribute-based Encryption and backed by a blockchain. Our large-scale feasibility study is motivated by a real-world manufacturing process, i.e., a fine blanking line, and reveals only modest costs for multi-hop tracing and tracking of goods.
supply chain; multi-hop tracking and tracing; blockchain; attribute-based encryption; Internet of Production
internet-of-production
https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-supply-chain-privacy.pdf
IEEE
Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC Workshops '20), 1st Workshop on Blockchain for IoT and Cyber-Physical Systems (BIoTCPS '20), June 7-11, 2020, Dublin, Ireland
Dublin, Ireland
June 7-11, 2020
978-1-7281-7440-2
2474-9133
10.1109/ICCWorkshops49005.2020.9145100
1
JanPennekamp
LennartBader
RomanMatzutt
PhilippNiemietz
DanielTrauth
MartinHenze
ThomasBergs
KlausWehrle
inproceedings
2020_roepert_opcua
Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments
2020
4
2
To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.
internet-of-production, rfc
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-roepert-opcua-security.pdf
en
University of Tübingen
Proceedings of the 1st ITG Workshop on IT Security (ITSec '20), April 2-3, 2020, Tübingen, Germany
Tübingen, Germany
April 2-3, 2020
10.15496/publikation-41813
1
LinusRoepert
MarkusDahlmanns
Ina BereniceFink
JanPennekamp
MartinHenze