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@Inproceedings { 2020_pennekamp_benchmarking,
   title = {Revisiting the Privacy Needs of Real-World Applicable Company Benchmarking},
   year = {2020},
   month = {12},
   day = {15},
   pages = {31-44},
   abstract = {Benchmarking the performance of companies is essential to identify improvement potentials in various industries. Due to a competitive environment, this process imposes strong privacy needs, as leaked business secrets can have devastating effects on participating companies. Consequently, related work proposes to protect sensitive input data of companies using secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption. However, related work so far does not consider that also the benchmarking algorithm, used in today's applied real-world scenarios to compute all relevant statistics, itself contains significant intellectual property, and thus needs to be protected. Addressing this issue, we present PCB — a practical design for Privacy-preserving Company Benchmarking that utilizes homomorphic encryption and a privacy proxy — which is specifically tailored for realistic real-world applications in which we protect companies' sensitive input data and the valuable algorithms used to compute underlying key performance indicators. We evaluate PCB's performance using synthetic measurements and showcase its applicability alongside an actual company benchmarking performed in the domain of injection molding, covering 48 distinct key performance indicators calculated out of hundreds of different input values. By protecting the privacy of all participants, we enable them to fully profit from the benefits of company benchmarking.},
   keywords = {practical encrypted computing; homomorphic encryption; algorithm confidentiality; benchmarking; key performance indicators; industrial application; Internet of Production},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-company-benchmarking.pdf},
   web_url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1512},
   publisher = {HomomorphicEncryption.org},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Encrypted Computing \& Applied Homomorphic Cryptography (WAHC '20), December 15, 2020, Virtual Event},
   event_place = {Virtual Event},
   event_date = {December 15, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-3-00-067798-4},
   DOI = {10.25835/0072999},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Sapel, Patrick and Fink, Ina Berenice and Wagner, Simon and Reuter, Sebastian and Hopmann, Christian and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020-wolsing-facilitating,
   title = {Poster: Facilitating Protocol-independent Industrial Intrusion Detection Systems},
   year = {2020},
   month = {11},
   day = {9},
   abstract = {Cyber-physical systems are increasingly threatened by sophisticated attackers, also attacking the physical aspect of systems. Supplementing protective measures, industrial intrusion detection systems promise to detect such attacks. However, due to industrial protocol diversity and lack of standard interfaces, great efforts are required to adapt these technologies to a large number of different protocols. To address this issue, we identify existing universally applicable intrusion detection approaches and propose a transcription for industrial protocols to realize protocol-independent semantic intrusion detection on top of different industrial protocols.},
   keywords = {Intrusion Detection; IDS; Industrial Protocols; CPS; IEC-60870-5-104; Modbus; NMEA 0183},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-wolsing-facilitating.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   address = {New York, NY, USA},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA.},
   event_place = {Virtual Event, USA},
   event_date = {November 9-13, 2020},
   DOI = {10.1145/3372297.3420019},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Wolsing, Konrad and Wagner, Eric and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity,
   title = {Poster: Cybersecurity Research and Training for Power Distribution Grids -- A Blueprint},
   year = {2020},
   month = {11},
   day = {9},
   abstract = {Mitigating cybersecurity threats in power distribution grids requires a testbed for cybersecurity, e.g., to evaluate the (physical) impact of cyberattacks, generate datasets, test and validate security approaches, as well as train technical personnel. In this paper, we present a blueprint for such a testbed that relies on network emulation and power flow computation to couple real network applications with a simulated power grid. We discuss the benefits of our approach alongside preliminary results and various use cases for cybersecurity research and training for power distribution grids.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   address = {New York, NY, USA},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA.},
   event_place = {Virtual Event, USA},
   event_date = {November 9-13, 2020},
   DOI = {10.1145/3372297.3420016},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Henze, Martin and Bader, Lennart and Filter, Julian and Lamberts, Olav and Ofner, Simon and van der Velde, Dennis}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua,
   title = {Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments},
   year = {2020},
   month = {10},
   day = {27},
   pages = {101-110},
   abstract = {Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24\% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24\%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25\%) on in total 92\% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.},
   keywords = {industrial communication; network security; security configuration},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), October 27-29, 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA},
   event_place = {Pittsburgh, PA, USA},
   event_name = {ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2020},
   event_date = {October 27-29, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10},
   DOI = {10.1145/3419394.3423666},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Fink, Ina Berenice and Pennekamp, Jan and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Article { serror-iiotsec-tii-2020,
   title = {Challenges and Opportunities in Securing the Industrial Internet of Things},
   journal = {IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics},
   year = {2020},
   month = {9},
   day = {11},
   volume = {17},
   number = {5},
   pages = {2985-2996},
   tags = {nerd-nrw},
   url = {https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-serror-tii-iiotsec.pdf},
   web_url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9195014},
   howpublished = {online},
   ISSN = {1941-0050},
   DOI = {10.1109/TII.2020.3023507},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Serror, Martin and Hack, Sacha and Henze, Martin and Schuba, Marko and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020_matzutt_coinprune,
   title = {How to Securely Prune Bitcoin’s Blockchain},
   year = {2020},
   month = {6},
   day = {24},
   pages = {298-306},
   abstract = {Bitcoin was the first successful decentralized cryptocurrency and remains the most popular of its kind to this day. Despite the benefits of its blockchain, Bitcoin still faces serious scalability issues, most importantly its ever-increasing blockchain size. While alternative designs introduced schemes to periodically create snapshots and thereafter prune older blocks, already-deployed systems such as Bitcoin are often considered incapable of adopting corresponding approaches. In this work, we revise this popular belief and present CoinPrune, a snapshot-based pruning scheme that is fully compatible with Bitcoin. CoinPrune can be deployed through an opt-in velvet fork, i.e., without impeding the established Bitcoin network. By requiring miners to publicly announce and jointly reaffirm recent snapshots on the blockchain, CoinPrune establishes trust into the snapshots' correctness even in the presence of powerful adversaries. Our evaluation shows that CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements of Bitcoin already by two orders of magnitude today, with further relative savings as the blockchain grows. In our experiments, nodes only have to fetch and process 5 GiB instead of 230 GiB of data when joining the network, reducing the synchronization time on powerful devices from currently 5 h to 46 min, with even more savings for less powerful devices.},
   keywords = {blockchain; block pruning; synchronization; bootstrapping; scalability; velvet fork; Bitcoin},
   tags = {mynedata; impact_digital; digital_campus},
   url = {https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-matzutt-coinprune.pdf},
   web_url = {https://coinprune.comsys.rwth-aachen.de},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th IFIP Networking 2020 Conference (NETWORKING '20), June 22-26, 2020, Paris, France},
   event_place = {Paris, France},
   event_name = {NETWORKING 2020},
   event_date = {June 22-26, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-3-903176-28-7},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Matzutt, Roman and Kalde, Benedikt and Pennekamp, Jan and Drichel, Arthur and Henze, Martin and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020_pennekamp_supply_chain_accountability,
   title = {Private Multi-Hop Accountability for Supply Chains},
   year = {2020},
   month = {6},
   day = {7},
   abstract = {Today's supply chains are becoming increasingly flexible in nature. While adaptability is vastly increased, these more dynamic associations necessitate more extensive data sharing among different stakeholders while simultaneously overturning previously established levels of trust. Hence, manufacturers' demand to track goods and to investigate root causes of issues across their supply chains becomes more challenging to satisfy within these now untrusted environments. Complementarily, suppliers need to keep any data irrelevant to such routine checks secret to remain competitive. To bridge the needs of contractors and suppliers in increasingly flexible supply chains, we thus propose to establish a privacy-preserving and distributed multi-hop accountability log among the involved stakeholders based on Attribute-based Encryption and backed by a blockchain. Our large-scale feasibility study is motivated by a real-world manufacturing process, i.e., a fine blanking line, and reveals only modest costs for multi-hop tracing and tracking of goods.},
   keywords = {supply chain; multi-hop tracking and tracing; blockchain; attribute-based encryption; Internet of Production},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-supply-chain-privacy.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC Workshops '20), 1st Workshop on Blockchain for IoT and Cyber-Physical Systems (BIoTCPS '20), June 7-11, 2020, Dublin, Ireland},
   event_place = {Dublin, Ireland},
   event_date = {June 7-11, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-1-7281-7440-2},
   ISSN = {2474-9133},
   DOI = {10.1109/ICCWorkshops49005.2020.9145100},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Bader, Lennart and Matzutt, Roman and Niemietz, Philipp and Trauth, Daniel and Henze, Martin and Bergs, Thomas and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020_roepert_opcua,
   title = {Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments},
   year = {2020},
   month = {4},
   day = {2},
   abstract = {To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-roepert-opcua-security.pdf},
   misc2 = {en},
   publisher = {University of T{\"u}bingen},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st ITG Workshop on IT Security (ITSec '20), April 2-3, 2020, T{\"u}bingen, Germany},
   event_place = {T{\"u}bingen, Germany},
   event_date = {April 2-3, 2020},
   DOI = {10.15496/publikation-41813},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Roepert, Linus and Dahlmanns, Markus and Fink, Ina Berenice and Pennekamp, Jan and Henze, Martin}
}