This file was created by the TYPO3 extension bib --- Timezone: CEST Creation date: 2024-04-25 Creation time: 14-47-50 --- Number of references 3 inproceedings 2020_delacadena_trafficsliver 2020 11 12 1971-1985 Website fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node — one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor — a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only. To limit the exposure of Tor users to WFP, we propose novel lightweight WFP defenses, TrafficSliver, which successfully counter today’s WFP classifiers with reasonable bandwidth and latency overheads and, thus, make them attractive candidates for adoption in Tor. Through user-controlled splitting of traffic over multiple Tor entry nodes, TrafficSliver limits the data a single entry node can observe and distorts repeatable traffic patterns exploited by WFP attacks. We first propose a network-layer defense, in which we apply the concept of multipathing entirely within the Tor network. We show that our network-layer defense reduces the accuracy from more than 98% to less than 16% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. We further suggest an elegant client-side application-layer defense, which is independent of the underlying anonymization network. By sending single HTTP requests for different web objects over distinct Tor entry nodes, our application-layer defense reduces the detection rate of WFP classifiers by almost 50 percentage points. Although it offers lower protection than our network-layer defense, it provides a security boost at the cost of a very low implementation overhead and is fully compatible with today’s Tor network. Traffic Analysis; Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-delacadena-trafficsliver.pdf https://github.com/TrafficSliver ACM Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '20), November 9-13, 2020, Orlando, FL, USA Virtual Event, USA November 9-13, 2020 978-1-4503-7089-9/20/11 10.1145/3372297.3423351 1 WladimirDe la Cadena AsyaMitseva JensHiller JanPennekamp SebastianReuter JulianFilter KlausWehrle ThomasEngel AndriyPanchenko inproceedings 2019_delacadena_countermeasure 2019 11 12 2533-2535 Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95% to less than 35% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-delacadena-splitting-defense.pdf ACM Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '19), November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom London, United Kingdom November 11-15, 2019 978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11 10.1145/3319535.3363249 1 WladimirDe la Cadena AsyaMitseva JanPennekamp JensHiller FabianLanze ThomasEngel KlausWehrle AndriyPanchenko inproceedings 2019_pennekamp_multipath 2019 10 7 Users of an onion routing network, such as Tor, depend on its anonymity properties. However, especially malicious entry nodes, which know the client’s identity, can also observe the whole communication on their link to the client and, thus, conduct several de-anonymization attacks. To limit this exposure and to impede corresponding attacks, we propose to multipath traffic between the client and the middle node to reduce the information an attacker can obtain at a single vantage point. To facilitate the deployment, only clients and selected middle nodes need to implement our approach, which works transparently for the remaining legacy nodes. Furthermore, we let clients control the splitting strategy to prevent any external manipulation. Poster Session https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-pennekamp-multipathing.pdf IEEE Proceedings of the 27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP '19), October 7-10, 2019, Chicago, IL, USA Chicago, IL, USA 27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2019) 7-10. Oct. 2019 978-1-7281-2700-2 2643-3303 10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888029 1 JanPennekamp JensHiller SebastianReuter WladimirDe la Cadena AsyaMitseva MartinHenze ThomasEngel KlausWehrle AndriyPanchenko