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bib
--- Timezone: CEST
Creation date: 2024-04-19
Creation time: 15-39-39
--- Number of references
3
inproceedings
2020_pennekamp_parameter_exchange
Privacy-Preserving Production Process Parameter Exchange
2020
12
10
510-525
Nowadays, collaborations between industrial companies always go hand in hand with trust issues, i.e., exchanging valuable production data entails the risk of improper use of potentially sensitive information. Therefore, companies hesitate to offer their production data, e.g., process parameters that would allow other companies to establish new production lines faster, against a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the expected benefits of industrial collaboration, data exchanges, and the utilization of external knowledge are significant.
In this paper, we introduce our Bloom filter-based Parameter Exchange (BPE), which enables companies to exchange process parameters privacy-preservingly. We demonstrate the applicability of our platform based on two distinct real-world use cases: injection molding and machine tools. We show that BPE is both scalable and deployable for different needs to foster industrial collaborations. Thereby, we reward data-providing companies with payments while preserving their valuable data and reducing the risks of data leakage.
secure industrial collaboration; Bloom filter; oblivious transfer; Internet of Production
internet-of-production
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-parameter-exchange.pdf
ACM
Proceedings of the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA
Austin, TX, USA
December 7-11, 2020
978-1-4503-8858-0/20/12
10.1145/3427228.3427248
1
JanPennekamp
ErikBuchholz
YannikLockner
MarkusDahlmanns
TiandongXi
MarcelFey
ChristianBrecher
ChristianHopmann
KlausWehrle
inproceedings
2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua
Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments
2020
10
27
101-110
Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25%) on in total 92% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.
industrial communication; network security; security configuration
internet-of-production, rfc
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua.pdf
ACM
Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), October 27-29, 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2020
October 27-29, 2020
978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10
10.1145/3419394.3423666
1
MarkusDahlmanns
JohannesLohmöller
Ina BereniceFink
JanPennekamp
KlausWehrle
MartinHenze
inproceedings
2020_roepert_opcua
Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments
2020
4
2
To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.
internet-of-production, rfc
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-roepert-opcua-security.pdf
en
University of Tübingen
Proceedings of the 1st ITG Workshop on IT Security (ITSec '20), April 2-3, 2020, Tübingen, Germany
Tübingen, Germany
April 2-3, 2020
10.15496/publikation-41813
1
LinusRoepert
MarkusDahlmanns
Ina BereniceFink
JanPennekamp
MartinHenze