% % This file was created by the TYPO3 extension % bib % --- Timezone: CET % Creation date: 2024-03-28 % Creation time: 11-35-44 % --- Number of references % 8 % @Inproceedings { 2020_pennekamp_benchmarking, title = {Revisiting the Privacy Needs of Real-World Applicable Company Benchmarking}, year = {2020}, month = {12}, day = {15}, pages = {31-44}, abstract = {Benchmarking the performance of companies is essential to identify improvement potentials in various industries. Due to a competitive environment, this process imposes strong privacy needs, as leaked business secrets can have devastating effects on participating companies. Consequently, related work proposes to protect sensitive input data of companies using secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption. However, related work so far does not consider that also the benchmarking algorithm, used in today's applied real-world scenarios to compute all relevant statistics, itself contains significant intellectual property, and thus needs to be protected. Addressing this issue, we present PCB — a practical design for Privacy-preserving Company Benchmarking that utilizes homomorphic encryption and a privacy proxy — which is specifically tailored for realistic real-world applications in which we protect companies' sensitive input data and the valuable algorithms used to compute underlying key performance indicators. We evaluate PCB's performance using synthetic measurements and showcase its applicability alongside an actual company benchmarking performed in the domain of injection molding, covering 48 distinct key performance indicators calculated out of hundreds of different input values. By protecting the privacy of all participants, we enable them to fully profit from the benefits of company benchmarking.}, keywords = {practical encrypted computing; homomorphic encryption; algorithm confidentiality; benchmarking; key performance indicators; industrial application; Internet of Production}, tags = {internet-of-production}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-company-benchmarking.pdf}, web_url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1512}, publisher = {HomomorphicEncryption.org}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Encrypted Computing \& Applied Homomorphic Cryptography (WAHC '20), December 15, 2020, Virtual Event}, event_place = {Virtual Event}, event_date = {December 15, 2020}, ISBN = {978-3-00-067798-4}, DOI = {10.25835/0072999}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Sapel, Patrick and Fink, Ina Berenice and Wagner, Simon and Reuter, Sebastian and Hopmann, Christian and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin} } @Inproceedings { 2020_pennekamp_parameter_exchange, title = {Privacy-Preserving Production Process Parameter Exchange}, year = {2020}, month = {12}, day = {10}, pages = {510-525}, abstract = {Nowadays, collaborations between industrial companies always go hand in hand with trust issues, i.e., exchanging valuable production data entails the risk of improper use of potentially sensitive information. Therefore, companies hesitate to offer their production data, e.g., process parameters that would allow other companies to establish new production lines faster, against a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the expected benefits of industrial collaboration, data exchanges, and the utilization of external knowledge are significant. In this paper, we introduce our Bloom filter-based Parameter Exchange (BPE), which enables companies to exchange process parameters privacy-preservingly. We demonstrate the applicability of our platform based on two distinct real-world use cases: injection molding and machine tools. We show that BPE is both scalable and deployable for different needs to foster industrial collaborations. Thereby, we reward data-providing companies with payments while preserving their valuable data and reducing the risks of data leakage.}, keywords = {secure industrial collaboration; Bloom filter; oblivious transfer; Internet of Production}, tags = {internet-of-production}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-parameter-exchange.pdf}, publisher = {ACM}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA}, event_place = {Austin, TX, USA}, event_date = {December 7-11, 2020}, ISBN = {978-1-4503-8858-0/20/12}, DOI = {10.1145/3427228.3427248}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Buchholz, Erik and Lockner, Yannik and Dahlmanns, Markus and Xi, Tiandong and Fey, Marcel and Brecher, Christian and Hopmann, Christian and Wehrle, Klaus} } @Proceedings { fink-lcn-demons-2020, title = {Extending MUD to Smartphones}, year = {2020}, month = {11}, day = {15}, tags = {nerd-nrw}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-fink-lcn-mud-smartphone.pdf}, publisher = {IEEE}, howpublished = {online}, event_place = {Sydney, Australia}, event_name = {45th IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)}, event_date = {November 16-19, 2020}, DOI = {10.1109/LCN48667.2020.9314782}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Fink, Ina Berenice and Serror, Martin and Wehrle, Klaus} } @Inproceedings { 2020_delacadena_trafficsliver, title = {TrafficSliver: Fighting Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Traffic Splitting}, year = {2020}, month = {11}, day = {12}, pages = {1971-1985}, abstract = {Website fingerprinting (WFP) aims to infer information about the content of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows based on the size and direction of packets. By collecting traffic traces at a malicious Tor entry node — one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of Tor — a passive eavesdropper can leverage the captured meta-data to reveal the websites visited by a Tor user. As recently shown, WFP is significantly more effective and realistic than assumed. Concurrently, former WFP defenses are either infeasible for deployment in real-world settings or defend against specific WFP attacks only. To limit the exposure of Tor users to WFP, we propose novel lightweight WFP defenses, TrafficSliver, which successfully counter today’s WFP classifiers with reasonable bandwidth and latency overheads and, thus, make them attractive candidates for adoption in Tor. Through user-controlled splitting of traffic over multiple Tor entry nodes, TrafficSliver limits the data a single entry node can observe and distorts repeatable traffic patterns exploited by WFP attacks. We first propose a network-layer defense, in which we apply the concept of multipathing entirely within the Tor network. We show that our network-layer defense reduces the accuracy from more than 98\% to less than 16\% for all state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic. We further suggest an elegant client-side application-layer defense, which is independent of the underlying anonymization network. By sending single HTTP requests for different web objects over distinct Tor entry nodes, our application-layer defense reduces the detection rate of WFP classifiers by almost 50 percentage points. Although it offers lower protection than our network-layer defense, it provides a security boost at the cost of a very low implementation overhead and is fully compatible with today’s Tor network.}, keywords = {Traffic Analysis; Website Fingerprinting; Privacy; Anonymous Communication; Onion Routing; Web Privacy}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-delacadena-trafficsliver.pdf}, web_url = {https://github.com/TrafficSliver}, publisher = {ACM}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '20), November 9-13, 2020, Orlando, FL, USA}, event_place = {Virtual Event, USA}, event_date = {November 9-13, 2020}, ISBN = {978-1-4503-7089-9/20/11}, DOI = {10.1145/3372297.3423351}, reviewed = {1}, author = {De la Cadena, Wladimir and Mitseva, Asya and Hiller, Jens and Pennekamp, Jan and Reuter, Sebastian and Filter, Julian and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas and Panchenko, Andriy} } @Inproceedings { 2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity, title = {Poster: Cybersecurity Research and Training for Power Distribution Grids -- A Blueprint}, year = {2020}, month = {11}, day = {9}, abstract = {Mitigating cybersecurity threats in power distribution grids requires a testbed for cybersecurity, e.g., to evaluate the (physical) impact of cyberattacks, generate datasets, test and validate security approaches, as well as train technical personnel. In this paper, we present a blueprint for such a testbed that relies on network emulation and power flow computation to couple real network applications with a simulated power grid. We discuss the benefits of our approach alongside preliminary results and various use cases for cybersecurity research and training for power distribution grids.}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-henze-ccs-cybersecurity.pdf}, publisher = {ACM}, address = {New York, NY, USA}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’20), November 9–13, 2020, Virtual Event, USA.}, event_place = {Virtual Event, USA}, event_date = {November 9-13, 2020}, DOI = {10.1145/3372297.3420016}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Henze, Martin and Bader, Lennart and Filter, Julian and Lamberts, Olav and Ofner, Simon and van der Velde, Dennis} } @Inproceedings { 2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua, title = {Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments}, year = {2020}, month = {10}, day = {27}, pages = {101-110}, abstract = {Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24\% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24\%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25\%) on in total 92\% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.}, keywords = {industrial communication; network security; security configuration}, tags = {internet-of-production, rfc}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua.pdf}, publisher = {ACM}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), October 27-29, 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA}, event_place = {Pittsburgh, PA, USA}, event_name = {ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2020}, event_date = {October 27-29, 2020}, ISBN = {978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10}, DOI = {10.1145/3419394.3423666}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Fink, Ina Berenice and Pennekamp, Jan and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin} } @Inproceedings { 2020_roepert_opcua, title = {Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments}, year = {2020}, month = {4}, day = {2}, abstract = {To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.}, tags = {internet-of-production, rfc}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-roepert-opcua-security.pdf}, misc2 = {en}, publisher = {University of T{\"u}bingen}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st ITG Workshop on IT Security (ITSec '20), April 2-3, 2020, T{\"u}bingen, Germany}, event_place = {T{\"u}bingen, Germany}, event_date = {April 2-3, 2020}, DOI = {10.15496/publikation-41813}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Roepert, Linus and Dahlmanns, Markus and Fink, Ina Berenice and Pennekamp, Jan and Henze, Martin} } @Article { 2020_mann_welding_layers, title = {Connected, digitalized welding production — Secure, ubiquitous utilization of data across process layers}, journal = {Advanced Structured Materials}, year = {2020}, month = {4}, day = {1}, volume = {125}, pages = {101-118}, abstract = {A connected, digitalized welding production unlocks vast and dynamic potentials: from improving state of the art welding to new business models in production. For this reason, offering frameworks, which are capable of addressing multiple layers of applications on the one hand and providing means of data security and privacy for ubiquitous dataflows on the other hand, is an important step to enable the envisioned advances. In this context, welding production has been introduced from the perspective of interlaced process layers connecting information sources across various entities. Each layer has its own distinct challenges from both a process view and a data perspective. Besides, investigating each layer promises to reveal insight into (currently unknown) process interconnections. This approach has been substantiated by methods for data security and privacy to draw a line between secure handling of data and the need of trustworthy dealing with sensitive data among different parties and therefore partners. In conclusion, the welding production has to develop itself from an accumulation of local and isolated data sources towards a secure industrial collaboration in an Internet of Production.}, note = {Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Advanced Joining Processes (AJP '19)}, keywords = {Welding Production; Industrie 4.0; Internet of Production; Data Security; Data Privacy}, tags = {Internet-of-Production}, url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-mann-welding-layers.pdf}, publisher = {Springer}, event_place = {Ponta Delgada, Azores, Portugal}, event_date = {October 24-25, 2019}, ISBN = {978-981-15-2956-6}, ISSN = {1869-8433}, DOI = {10.1007/978-981-15-2957-3_8}, reviewed = {1}, author = {Mann, Samuel and Pennekamp, Jan and Brockhoff, Tobias and Farhang, Anahita and Pourbafrani, Mahsa and Oster, Lukas and Uysal, Merih Seran and Sharma, Rahul and Reisgen, Uwe and Wehrle, Klaus and van der Aalst, Wil} }