Abstract
Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95% to less than 35% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic.
Type
Publication
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '19)
Wladimir De La Cadena
Asya Mitseva
Dr. rer. nat. Jan Pennekamp
Postdoctoral Researcher
Fabian Lanze
Thomas Engel
Klaus Wehrle
Head of Group